Abstract. Consider a random real n-vector Z of preference scores. Item i is preferred to item j if Z i < Z j . Suppose P{Z i = Z j } = 0 for i = j. Item k is the favorite if Z k < min i =k Z i . This model generalizes Thurstone's Law of Comparative Judgment. Let p i denote the chance that item i is the favorite. We characterize a large class of distributions for Z for which p 1 > p 2 > . . . > p n . Our results are most surprising when
Introduction
"Sophomore slump" is part of the folklore of professional sports: the Rookie of the Year is rarely the best performer of his cohort the following year. While we are not aware of any serious study of the depth, pervasiveness, or consistency of the phenomenon, pundits claim it exists and that it occurs because the star becomes intoxicated by his or her success, distracted by product endorsements, or stressed by the expectations of coaches or fans. The standard statistical explanation is regression towards the mean: exceptional performance involves both skill and luck, and lightning is unlikely to strike the same player two years in a row, so one should expect second-year performance to be worse.
Similarly, [Kah11] recounts an experience with a group of Wall Street investment advisors whose compensation is tied to how their performance ranks compared to that of their colleagues. He wondered, "Did the same advisers consistently achieve better returns for their clients year after year? Did some advisers consistently display more skill than others?" Computing year-over-year correlation in performances for 25 advisors over eight years revealed: "The stability that would indicate differences in skill was not to be found. The results resembled what you would expect from a dice-rolling contest, not a game of skill." This too might be explained by regression towards the mean: the performances in a given year of the 25 advisors are like independent, identically distributed (IID) draws from a single population.
Here, we show that degradation of performance in these two examples is also to be expected-and expected to be more pronounced-in a broad class of stochastic models for rankings in which individual performances are independent and have equal means but different variances. Consider a group of n ≥ 3 individuals with equal skill, in the sense that in a head-to-head contest between any two, there is an equal chance that either will win. For each individual i, consider Pr i (x), the chance that the absolute value of the difference between his or her performance and the expected performance exceeds x. Suppose the individuals are well ordered by these probabilities: for all x > 0, Pr 1 (x) > Pr 2 (x) > . . . > Pr n (x). If a greater chance of extreme performance results from deliberate risk-taking, then individual 1 is "boldest." If these n individuals compete, individual 1 is the most is most likely to perform best. In this sense, fortune favors the bold. (Symmetry dictates that individual 1 is also most likely to perform worst!) This result may have implications for a broad range of ranking problems, from purchasing breakfast cereal to voting, that require an individual to list a finite set of items in order of preference, or at least to decide which item he/she prefers most.
To make our results mathematically precise and to connect them to the literature on stochastic models for ranking and ordering, we require the following notation and terminology. Label the n items with the set of integers [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. An individual's preferences can be represented in two related ways: either we report the order vector (w(1), w(2), . . . , w(n)), where w(1) ∈ [n] is the label of the most favored item, w(2) is the label of the second most favored item, etc., or we report the corresponding rank vector (y(1), y(2), . . . , y(n)), where w(y(i)) = i for i ∈ [n].
The order vector and rank vector are permutations of the set [n]. There is a huge literature on models of random permutations, much of which attempts to capture features of how individuals actually go about assigning orders or rankings using whatever information they have at their disposal. The standard reference is [Mar95] , with [Dia88, FV93] as useful adjuncts.
The earliest model for assigning orders is due to [Thu27, Thu31] . In this model the item labeled i is associated with a (real-valued) random variable Z i , where the random vector Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) is such that P{Z i = Z j } = 0 for i = j, and the resulting order vector is (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) if Z i 1 < Z i 2 < . . . < Z in . One may interpret −Z i as the desirability of item i measured on a one-dimensional scale, so that items are ordered in decreasing order of their perceived desirability.
In many applications, it is more natural to consider Z i rather than −Z i to be the desirability. For example, one might model a population of voters so that Z i models the number of voters who will vote for candidate i (see, for example, [Las06] ). The candidate who garners the most votes wins the election. As an another example, consider the use in machine learning of Thompson Sampling for the multi-armed bandit problem. The random variable Z i models the benefit resulting from pulling arm i. The Z i are sampled and the arm with maximum Z i is pulled [Tho33, AG11] . Nonetheless, we shall continue here to follow the tradition of Thurstone, and let −Z i model the desirability of item i.
Let Z * denote min{Z i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, the smallest Z i value, and let I * denote argmin{Z i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, the index of the minimum Z i value. Let p i denote the probability that the rank of item i is 1 (i.e., that i = I * ).
Given a specification of Z, there are three closely-related problems to consider:
(1) Finding the distribution of Z * . See [Gum04, KN00, dHF06, Res08] for a sample of the extensive body of work in this area. (2) Determining which i is most likely to be I * . (3) Given i, deriving an expression for p i .
We do not consider problem 1 here; our focus is on problem 2, particularly when, as is usually the case, solving 2 by solving 3 seems intractable. Most generally, we are concerned with finding conditions that imply that p 1 > p 2 > . . . > p n .
We briefly survey various distributional assumptions on Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) that have been considered in this context.
Thurstone proposed taking Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) to have a nondegenerate Gaussian distribution. Despite its conceptual simplicity, this model is rather daunting computationally. Here p i is the probability that Z falls in the region R := {z ∈ R n : z i < z j , j = i}, the intersection of half-spaces j =i {z ∈ R n : z i − z j < 0}. We can write
, where µ is the mean vector of Z, Σ is the variancecovariance matrix of Z, Σ 1 2 is the positive definite symmetric square root of Σ, and X is a vector with independent standard normal entries. We are therefore interested in the probability that X falls in the polyhedral region (R − µ)Σ − 1 2 . It is usually not possible to express such probabilities in a simple closed form, but there is a large literature on approximating them numerically using various ingenious recursive schemes-see, for example, [GDS02, MHK03, Cra08] . Appendix A shows that when {Z i } n i=1 are independent Gaussian random variables, computing the probabilities {p i } n i=1 explicitly is somewhat complex even when n is 3.
Appendix B shows that a similar remark is true when
is a vector of independent random variables with bilateral exponential distributions.
However, if all one cares about is the the ordering of the p i 's, then the results of the present paper may apply to cases where explicitly computing {p i } is intractable.
Daniels [Dan50] suggested taking the random vector Z in Thurstone's general model to be of the form (θ 1 + X 1 , . . . , θ n + X n ), where θ 1 , . . . , θ n are real-valued parameters and X 1 , . . . , X n are independent and identically distributed (IID) random variables. Equivalently (by exponentiating), one can take Z to be of the form (γ 1 Y 1 , . . . , γ n Y n ), where γ 1 , . . . , γ n are positive parameters and Y 1 , . . . , Y n are IID positive random variables. It is not hard to show in this case that if θ i < θ j (or γ i < γ j ), then i is more likely than j to have rank 1 (for example, see Remark 4.2 below). Savage [Sav57] provides a number of other results about the dependence on the parameters of various other probabilities related to the order and rank vectors.
A particularly tractable example of the multiplicative version of Daniels' type of Thurstonian model is when (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) = (γ 1 Y 1 , . . . , γ n Y n ) with Y 1 , . . . , Y n IID exponential random variables. In this case the probability of a given order vector (i 1 , . . . , i n ) can be computed explicitly and is
where
This model is due to [Pla75] and [Luc59] , and was studied in [Sil80, Sil84] as the vase model: if we imagine a vase containing n types of balls with balls of type i being in proportion λ i /( j λ j ) and we remove balls one-by-one uniformly without replacement, then the order in which the n types appear is given by this model. The Plackett and Luce model is the only Thurstonian model of the Daniels type that satisfies the axioms laid out in [Luc59] for a rational choice procedure -see [Yel77] for a discussion.
The Plackett and Luce model is also the stationary distribution of a discrete-time Markov chain that is sometimes called the Tsetlin library process or the move-to-the-front self-organizing list. Here the items are pictured as books and an order vector (i 1 , . . . , i n ) corresponds to a stack with the book labeled i n on the bottom and the book labeled i 1 on top. In each step of the chain, book i is chosen with probability proportional to λ i , removed from its current position in the stack, and placed on top of the stack. See, e.g., [Riv76] for early work on this process, and [Fil96] for a detailed analysis of this Markov chain and an extensive review of the related literature.
Thurstonian models based on random vectors with much more complex structure are discussed in [Böc93, Böc06] .
Subsection 5.1 presents a third, more involved, example that illustrates a a model of a more complex type that is not built from IID random variables but where the assumptions of our main result, Theorem 3.1, giving the ordering of {p i } still applies. This example is cast in terms of the times taken by three workers to complete three randomly assigned tasks. The mean time for a worker to complete a task is the same for every (worker, task) pair, but the performance of the first worker is more variable than that of the second, which is in turn more variable than that of the third. Again, the explicit computation of the relevant p i 's is tedious and complex, while Theorem 3.1 easily easily allows one to find their ordering without such explicit computation and conclude that the first worker has the highest probability of finishing first while the second worker has the second highest probability of finishing first.
The theme of this paper is thus to investigate Thurstonian models and determine the ordering of the probabilities that each of the given items will be the most preferred, without having to explicitly compute these probabilities.
In other words, we study the distribution of the first entry in the order vector or, equivalently, the distribution of the label of the item with rank one, and we seek conditions on the distribution of the random vector (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) such that if p i is the probability that the item labeled i has rank one, then p 1 > p 2 > . . . > p n . As we have already remarked, this will happen in the Daniels model if θ 1 < θ 2 < . . . < θ n in the additive case and γ 1 < γ 2 < . . . < γ n in the multiplicative case. The latter conclusion can be verified by direct computation for the special case of the Plackett and Luce model, where
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we consider a Thurstonian-type model with (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) = (σ 1 X 1 , . . . , σ n X n ), where the σ i are positive constants and (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is a random vector with IID standard Gaussian entries. Of course, if
by the symmetry of the Gaussian distribution, but we show in Section 2 that if n ≥ 3 and σ 1 > σ 2 > . . . > σ n , then p 1 > p 2 > . . . > p n . For the case n = 3, we compute the values of {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } in Appendix A to emphasize the difficulty of establishing by direct computation that such an ordering holds for general n. If having a larger variance is considered "bolder," then this result supports the proverb "Fortune favors the bold."
One way of thinking about this result is that a choice is being made between n individuals based on their responses to a set of stimuli. The IID random variables (|X 1 |, . . . , |X n |) represent the random stimuli given to the individuals. The response of individual k to the stimulus |X k | is S k η k (|X k |), where η k (y) = σ k y and S k is the sign of X k , a {−1, +1}-valued random variable that is independent of |X k | and equally likely to be −1 or +1. For each k the function η k happens to be increasing but, as we shall see, that is irrelevant for a conclusion like that above. What is important is that η i (y) > η j (y) for all y and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, so that if the stimuli given to individuals i and j are the same, then the response of individual i is more extreme than that of individual j. The expected responses
, 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n, so that individual i has no advantage over individual j in a head-to-head contest, and yet
These observations suggest that a similar result might hold if
where (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is a suitable exchangeable {−1, +1} n -valued random vector (recall that a random vector is exchangeable if its joint distribution is unchanged by any permutation of the coordinates), (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) is an exchangeable E n -valued random vector for some measurable space E, and the functions η k : E → R + have the property that η i (y) > η j (y) for all y ∈ E and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n (so that the response Z i is "bolder" than the response Z j ). We show in Section 3 that this conclusion is indeed valid under appropriate assumptions (e.g. it is obvious that the desired ordering of the p k would not hold if S k = +1 with probability one for all k, and in order to rule this sort of situation out, we require that
a condition that, for example, holds when the S k are IID with individual probability at least
of taking the value −1). Finally, in Section 4 we look at the special case when the entries of of the vectors (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) and (S 1 , . . . , S n ) are both IID.
Motivating Gaussian example
Our interest in the general topic of this paper was piqued by the following observation about a Gaussian version of the Thurstone model that we have already discussed in the Introduction.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose n ≥ 3 and (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) = (σ 1 X 1 , . . . , σ n X n ), where σ i > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and the entries of the random vector (X 1 , . . . , X n ) are independent standard Gaussian random variables. If
Let φ and Φ denote the standard Gaussian probability density function and cumulative distribution function, respectively. Then (by conditioning on X i in the first integral, integrating by parts in the second, and applying the chain rule in the third),
and so
where we used the facts that φ(z) = φ(−z) for all z ∈ R and that the function Φ is increasing. It follows that p i is an increasing function of σ i , and, because p i = p j when σ i = σ j , it is clear that if
Remark 2.2. We show in Appendix A that when n = 3 
Main theorem
This section presents our main theorem, giving the most general conditions we have found so far that imply p 1 > p 2 > . . . > p n .
is an exchangeable E n -valued random vector for some measurable space (E, E); • η 1 , . . . , η n are measurable functions from E to R + with the property that η i (y) ≥ η j (y) for all y ∈ E and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n;
Proof. Let (T 1 , . . . , T n ) be a vector of independent random variables that is independent of the pair of random vectors (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) and (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and such that each random variable T k has an exponential distribution with mean 1. Set
By the assumptions of the theorem, for 0 ≤ m < n−1, q(m) = P{S k 1 = · · · = S km = +1; S k m+1 = −1} for any subset {k 1 , . . . , k m+1 } ⊆ [n] of cardinality m + 1 and q(n − 1) = P{S k 1 = · · · = S k n−1 = +1} for any subset {k 1 , . . . , k n−1 } ⊆ [n] of cardinality n − 1. Thus, q(1) ≥ q(2) ≥ . . . ≥ q(n − 2) and, by assumption, q(n − 2) ≥ q(n − 1). Suppose that a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ R + are distinct. If a k = ℓ a ℓ , then
whereas if a k = ℓ a ℓ , then
In either case,
Observe that the values of |Z
for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Since q(1) ≥ q(2) ≥ . . . ≥ q(n − 1), it suffices to show that M i is stochastically dominated by M j for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n; that is, that
Fix 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Note that 
It follows that P{M i ≥ m} ≤ P{M j ≥ m}, as required. = P{S 1 = · · · = S n−2 = +1; S n−1 = −1; S n = +1} +P{S 1 = · · · = S n−2 = +1; S n−1 = −1; S n = −1}
and
by the exchangeability hypothesis, so the hypothesis that
is equivalent to the hypothesis that
Again using exchangeability, the latter is equivalent to 1
Remark 3.3. Suppose in addition to the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1 that P{S i = S j = +1} = P{S i = S j = −1} for i = j. Then, by exchangeability,
Theorem 3.1 is most interesting in this case, because then Z i is not systematically smaller than Z j for i < j, and yet p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ · · · ≥ p n with strict inequalities under suitable assumptions (e.g. if P{Z i = Z j } = 0 for i = j).
Independent random variables
Theorem 3.1 has the following consequence when the entries of (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) are independent.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that n ≥ 3. Let (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) be an R n -valued random vector given by Z k = S k W k , 1 ≤ k ≤ n, where:
Define It follows from the stochastic ordering assumption on W 1 , . . . , W n that η i (y) ≥ η j (y) for y ∈ [0, 1] and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
Proof. It is possible to write
Also, if we write p for the common value of P{S k = +1}, then
The result now follows from Theorem 3.1. 
In particular, we recover Proposition 2.1 5. Applications 5.1. Randomized experiments. Suppose we are interested in comparing n treatments. We will test each treatment on one of n individuals, which might be people, families, banks, local or national economies, or plots of land, for instance. Treatments are assigned uniformly at random to individuals (i.e. all n! assignments are equally likely). The distribution of the response of individual j to treatment i is a distribution P ij that is symmetric about zero, so that no treatment causes any systematic benefit or harm to any individual. Suppose for each fixed j ∈ [n] and all y > 0 that P ij {x ∈ R : |x| > y} is nonincreasing in i, so that the magnitude of the responses of a fixed individual to the various treatments are stochastically nonincreasing in the treatment number (i.e. low numbered treatments are more likely to have effects with a large magnitude than high numbered treatments). Suppose further that given the assignment of treatments to individuals the responses of the individuals are conditionally independent. We can represent the response to treatment i as Z i = S i η i (Π i , U i ), where S 1 , . . . , S n are IID {−1, +1}-valued random variables with
. . , U n are IID random variables with a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1], and η i (j, ·) is the inverse of the function y → P ij {x ∈ R : |x| > y}, that is η i (j, u) := sup{y ≥ 0 : P ij {x ∈ R : |x| ≤ y} < u}.
By assumption η 1 (j, u) ≥ . . . ≥ η n (j, u), and it follows from Theorem 3.1 that p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ . . . ≥ p n . Hence, if we think of low values of the response as desirable, then low numbered treatments are likely to appear to be the most desirable in a single instance of the experiment, even though they are also likely to appear to be the least desirable.
In order to give a simple, concrete example of this phenomenon, consider a situation in which there are three tasks of comparable difficulty that have to be completed and three workers available to do them. In terms of the setting above, the tasks are the "individuals" and the workers are the "treatments."
Number the tasks 1, 2 and 3, and designate the workers by the letters A, B and C. The tasks are assigned to the workers at random, with the 3! = 6 possible allocations being equally likely. On average, the workers are equally rapid at completing a given task, but the performance of Worker A is more variable than that of Worker B, which is more variable than that of Worker C.
We model this very simply by assuming that the time taken to perform Task 1 by Worker A (respectively, Workers B and C) is either T − A or T + A (respectively, T − B or T + B, and T − C or T + C) with equal probability, where A, B, C are positive constants. Similarly, the respective times taken by the three workers to perform Tasks 2 and 3 are T ± a, T ± b, T ± c and T ± α, T ± β, T ± γ, with the two alternatives in each case always being equally likely. We assume that the times taken by the workers are conditionally independent given the random allocation of tasks (that is, all 2 3 = 8 possible choices of sign are equally likely for any particular allocation). Table 1 . Time for each of three workers to complete each of three tasks
The relative variability of the workers' performance is modeled by taking A > B > C, a > b > c, and α > β > γ. The ordering among these nine quantities is otherwise arbitrary. We thus have an instance of the general situation considered above with the inconsequential difference that the responses are symmetric about T rather than 0. We will explore how the probability that a particular worker finishes first depends on the ordering in detail.
Suppose the ordering is A > B > C > a > b > c > α > β > γ > 0. Then worker A finishes first in the following scenarios:
(1) All signs are negative and A is assigned task 1 (2 of 48) (2) Only the first and second signs are negative and A is assigned task 1, or A is assigned task 2 and B is assigned task 3 (3 of 48) (3) Only the first and third signs are negative and A is assigned task 1, or A is assigned task 2 and C is assigned task 3 (3 of 48) (4) Only the first sign is negative (6 of 48) (5) All signs are positive and A is assigned task 3 (2 of 48)
These comprise 16/48 = 1/3 of the equally likely possibilities, so the chance that A finishes first is 1/3. Similarly, worker B finishes first in the following scenarios:
(1) All signs are negative and B is assigned task 1 (2 of 48) (2) Only the first and second signs are negative and B is assigned task 1, or B is assigned task 2 and A is assigned task 3 (3 of 48) (3) Only the second and third signs are negative and B is assigned task 1, or B is assigned task 2 and C is assigned task 3 (3 of 48) (4) Only the third sign is negative (6 of 48) (5) All signs are positive and B is assigned task 3 (2 of 48) Again, these comprise 1/3 of the possibilities, so the chance that B finishes first is 1/3; the same is true for C.
However, if the ordering is A > a > α > B > b > β > C > c > γ > 0, then A finishes first if and only if the first sign is negative, which has chance 1/2. For this ordering, B finishes first if the first sign is positive and the second is negative, which has chance 1/4. Worker C finishes first if the first two signs are positive, which also has chance 1/4.
It is possible to consider the various other possibilities that are not the same as one of these two after a relabeling of the tasks; for example, if A > a > b > c > B > α > β > γ > C > 0, then the probability that Worker A finishes first is , whereas the probabilities that Workers B and C finish first are both . We do not present an exhaustive list of the results.
5.2. Sophomore Slump: an alternative explanation. The regression effect arises in situations where n individuals are tested and then re-tested. By assumption, individuals may have a different levels of skill, but every individual has the same distribution of luck, and that luck is independent across individuals and across trials. Conditional on an individual's performance on the first test, her performance on the second test is likely to be on the same side of average, but closer to average. If there are many individuals at each skill level, the individual who performs best on the first test is likely not to be best on the re-test. Regression towards the mean is the common statistical explanation for sophomore slump, as we mention in the introduction.
Our results give an alternative explanation: If a group of individuals have the same level of skill but some individuals respond in more consistently extreme ways to the vagaries of chance than others, then the individual most likely to perform best on a test is also most likely to perform worst on a re-test.
5.3. Heteroscedasticity and nonparametric tests of association. The null hypothesis for standard nonparametric (permutationbased) tests for association between two series, such as the Spearman rank correlation test, amounts to the hypothesis that one series is conditionally exchangeable given the other. Heteroscedasticity can make that null hypothesis false, even when there is no positive (resp. negative) association between the series, where by positive (resp. negative) association we mean that, in some sense, larger values of one variable tend to occur in conjunction with larger (resp. smaller) values of the other. Our results show qualitatively that this can distort the apparent p-value of permutation tests for association.
Consider a decreasing deterministic sequence x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and a sequence Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) whose components are independent and symmetrically distributed, but such that |Z i | stochastically dominates |Z j | for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. We haven't given a rigorous definition of association, but x and Z are not associated in any intuitively reasonable sense of the term. However, Corollary 4.1 shows that the first component of Z is most likely to be the largest; when that occurs, the rank of the largest component of Z is aligned with the rank of the largest component of x. The full distributional details are complicated, but one might expect that an extension of this phenomenon will tend to make the Spearman rank correlation coefficient r S take more extreme values than it would be if the null hypothesis of exchangeability held.
The following simple example from [Wal97, Wal99] shows that the quantitative difference in probabilities can be quite striking. Let x = (4, 3, 2, 1) and
where {Y i } are IID standard Gaussian variables, σ 1 = 2, and σ 2 = σ 3 = σ 4 = 1. The chance that r S = 1 is the chance that Z 1 > Z 2 > Z 3 > Z 4 . If {Z j } were exchangeable, then that chance would be 1/24 ≈ 4.17%. Simulation shows that in the heteroscedastic (nonexchangeable) model,
about 68% higher. Calibrating the Spearman rank correlation test using the null hypothesis of exchangeability is misleading, because heteroscedasticity alone makes the components of Z tend to be closer to ordered than they would be under random permutations. We can illustrate the phenomenon even more concretely with the three workers and three tasks example from Subsection 5.1. Note that if A > a > α > B > b > β > C > c > γ > 0, then the distribution of the order in which the workers A, B, C finish is uniform over the four possibilities (A, B, C), (A, C, B), (B, C, A), (C, B, A) and the distribution of the Spearman rank correlation r S between the vector of finish times for the three workers and the vector (1, 2, 3) is
whereas if the random vector of finish times were exchangeable (that is, if we were in the usual null situation for the Spearman rank correlation test), then the distribution of r S would be
so performing a Spearman rank correlation test would be likely to result in the conclusion that there is a positive (or negative) association between a worker's label and the worker's finish time.
Our results do not predict the magnitude of the distortion of the null distribution of r S , but they do suggest that there will be such a distortion quite generally when one sequence is heteroscedastic with an ordering of the degree of dispersal that matches the ordering of magnitudes of the other, even when the components of the first sequence are independent and have equal means.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented general conditions on a random vector (Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z n ) which guarantee that the probabilities p i := P{Z i < j =i Z j } satisfy p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ . . . ≥ p n ; that is, that the probability the i th coordinate is the smallest is decreasing in i. Analogous results hold for the the probability that the i th coordinate is the largest. The general conclusion is that "Fortune favors the bold," and that even if P{Z i > Z j } = P{Z i < Z j } for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n, so that no coordinate is systematically larger than another, we can still have situations in which such an ordering will occur because the variability of Z i decreases with i. Our results give technical precision to the intuition embodied by the proverb. We emphasize that our results do not require the explicit computation of the probability that Z i is extreme.
Presumably, even more general conditions that determine the ranks of the probabilities that each random variable will be extremal could be derived. Similarly, we have considered inequalities among the probabilities that different items will be most favored, but it should also be possible to derive inequalities among the probabilities that various subsets of the items will have various subsets of the ranks, not just the chances that each individual item is best. These remain open problems. A similar formula holds for P{Y < X ∧ Z} (resp. P{Z < X ∧ Y }) by interchanging the roles of α 2 and β 2 (resp. α 2 and γ 2 ). Some more algebra shows that α 4 (β 2 + α 2 )(γ 2 + α 2 ) − β 4 (α 2 + β 2 )(γ 2 + β 2 ) = (α 2 − β 2 )(α 2 β 2 + β 2 γ 2 + α 2 γ 2 ) (α 2 + β 2 )(α 2 + γ 2 )(β 2 + γ 2 ) > 0, and so P{X < Y ∧ Z} > P{Y < X ∧ Z}. Similarly, P{Y < X ∧ Z} > P{Z < X ∧ Y }. Suppose that X, Y, Z are independent real-valued random variables with respective densities f a , f b , f c , where the parameters satisfy a > b > c > 0, so that X is more dispersed than Y , which is more dispersed than Z.
